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ABSTRACT
In 2007, the National Labor Relations Board adopted
two clear rules concerning employee use of employerprovided email in Guard Publishing Co.: First, the Board
held that employers were not required to allow employees
to use employer-provided email to engage in protected
activity pursuant to section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act; second, the Board held that if an employer
allowed employees to use its email system for non-work
purposes, it could still lawfully adopt and enforce nondiscriminatory rules that restricted otherwise protected
activity. In 2014, the Board reversed this precedent in
Purple Communications, Inc., and held that employees
have a presumptive right to use an employer’s email system
to engage in protected activity on non-working time if they
are provided access to email for work-related purposes.
This article analyzes the conflicting guidance provided
by Guard Publishing Co. and Purple Communications, Inc.
against the broader context of prior precedent concerning
employer property rights. By highlighting numerous
*
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unanswered questions left open by the Board’s analysis in
Purple Communications, Inc., this article advocates for the
Board to reevaluate its position on employee use of
company technology resources, including email, and to
adopt a new framework that can readily and predictably be
applied to new and developing technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, more than ten years after email became common in
many workplaces, the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”
or “the Board”) first addressed whether employers must allow
employees to use employer-provided email systems to engage in
activity protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA” or “the Act”)1. In Guard Publishing Co., the Board held
employers did not have to allow employees unfettered access to
employer-provided email, and could restrict employee email use to

1

29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
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solely business purposes.2 If an employer did allow its employees
to use an email system for limited purposes that were not workrelated, then the employer could not discriminate between uses
protected by the Act. The Board’s approach was consistent with its
prior decisions concerning other employer equipment, such as
phones and bulletin boards.3
In 2014, a newly comprised Board overruled its prior holding.
In Purple Communications, Inc., the Board held employees have a
presumptive right to use an employer’s email system to engage in
protected activity if they are provided access to email for workrelated purposes. The Board went on to state that they would have
to revisit whether similar access should be granted to other types of
employer-provided equipment in the future.4
Email remains a popular tool for employees to communicate
and accomplish tasks in the workplace despite the proliferation of
new technologies such as electronic messaging systems and social
media platforms. These new technologies compete for employee
attention, affect employee safety and productivity, and raise data
security concerns. Unfortunately, the Board’s Purple
Communications decision leaves many questions unanswered
about the extent of an employer’s property rights concerning these
new (and even some old) technology tools. Employers must now
navigate an uncertain legal framework when regulating use of
employer-provided technology. This article discusses why Purple
Communications creates an unworkable standard and gives
inadequate deference to the Board’s prior precedent and employer
property rights, and proposes a new framework that need not be
revisited each time a new technology is adopted.
I.

PROTECTED ACTIVITY UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT

Congress enacted the Act in 1935. Section 7 of the Act
guarantees private-sector employees “the right to self-organization,
2

Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, *1116 (2007), overruled by Purple
Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014).
3
See, e.g., Mid-Mountain Foods, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 229, 230 (2000).
4
Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 75–6 (2014).
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to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.”5 Over time, Section 7 has been
interpreted to protect employee communication about unionization
and other terms and conditions of employment,6 including working
hours, pay, discipline, and safety issues.
The right to engage in protected activity is not without limits.
Over the past eighty years, the Board has wrestled with balancing
the “undisputed” rights of employees to engage in activity
protected by Section 7, against the “equally undisputed” rights of
employers to maintain discipline and productivity in the
workplace.7 The Supreme Court succinctly explained the Board’s
task as follows: “Accommodation between [employee-organization
rights and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little
destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the
other.”8
Applying this principle of accommodation, the Board has
developed a series of presumptions regarding employer rules that
seek to restrict protected activity by employees on employer
property. In Republic Aviation, the Supreme Court enforced a
decision by the Board invalidating an employer rule prohibiting
employees from engaging in oral solicitation on company property,
even during non-working time.9 Since Republic Aviation, the
Board has consistently recognized that employers may lawfully
limit solicitation during working time because of potential
interference with productivity.10 However, the Board narrowly
defines the term “solicitation,” limiting it to something more than
brief discussions about union organizing, such as a request to sign
an authorization card.11 Restrictions on solicitation activity during
5

29 U.S.C. § 157.
E.g., Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978); Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945).
7
Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 797–798.
8
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
9
Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 802.
10
See, e.g., Conagra Foods, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 113 at 7–8 (2014).
11
See id. at 8–9.
6
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non-working time are unlawful, regardless of whether the
solicitation occurs in a working area or break facilities.12
The Board strikes a different balance with the distribution of
literature, such as flyers, letters or other written materials. The
Board has held that employers must allow distribution of materials
by employees in non-working areas on non-working time.13
However, due to concerns about litter and employee distraction
(especially in manufacturing environments), employer restrictions
on distribution in working areas on non-working time are
presumptively lawful.14
In its attempt to balance employee and employer rights, the
Board has also developed specific rules concerning use of
employer equipment.15 Until 2014, employers could lawfully
prohibit the use of all employer equipment for non-work-related
purposes, including solicitation or distribution. Employer
equipment included copiers, phones, bulletin boards, and, until
2014, electronic resources, such as internet access and employerprovided email.
Just as access to employer property has been the subject of
frequent Board litigation, so has the scope of such access.16 The
majority held in Guard Publishing that an employer could restrict
use of its systems for protected activity, as long as it did not allow
personal use of a similar nature in its systems.17 For example, if an
employer allowed employees to post notices on behalf of
charitable or religious organizations on its bulletin boards, prohibit
postings for unions would be discriminatory and unlawful.18 As
described below, in 2014, the NLRB revisited this distinction, as
well as its holdings concerning employer equipment.

12

See Republic Aviation Corp., 324 U.S. at 802.
Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 621 (1962)
14
Id. at 643 n.12.
15
Container Corp. of Am., 244 N.L.R.B. 318, 318 n.2 (1979).
16
See NLRB v. Honeywell, Inc., 722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993).
17
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at 1121.
18
See, e.g., Fleming Cos.v. NLRB, 349 F.3d 968, 975 (7th Cir. 2003);
Guardian Indus. Corp. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317, 321–322 (7th Cir. 1995).
13
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II.

THE BOARD’S GUARD PUBLISHING DECISION

In Guard Publishing, the NLRB held in a 3-2 decision that
employees do not have a statutory right to use their employer’s
email system for activities protected by Section 7. Therefore, an
employer did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act by maintaining a work rule that prohibited
employees from using company email for all “non-job-related
solicitations.”19 Instead, and consistent with its prior decisions
concerning employer equipment, the Board held an employer
violated the Act only if it discriminatorily enforced an otherwise
neutral email policy against union-related emails while allowing
non-job-related personal emails.20
In Guard Publishing, the employer published The RegisterGuard, a daily newspaper with circulation in the Eugene, Oregon
area.21 Approximately 150 employees in various departments,
including reporters, photographers, copy editors, secretaries, and
advertising department employees, were represented by a Union,
the Eugene Newspaper Guild, CWA Local 37194, AFL–CIO
(“Union”).22 The employer began installing a computer and
information system at its facility in March 1996, and fully
implemented the system, including internet and e-mail capability
in 1997.23 The employer adopted a communications policy that
applied to use of its enhanced communications system, including
use of telephones, message machines, computers, fax machines,
photocopy machines, internet, and emails.24 The policy specifically
prohibited employees from using the employer’s communications
systems, including email, for commercial ventures, religious or
political causes, outside organizations, and other non-job-related
solicitations.25 After the employer disciplined an employee for
19

Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110 (2007), enforced, 571 F.3d 53
(D.C. Cir. 2009).
20
Id. at *1119.
21
Id. at *1133.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at *1133.
25
Id.
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using company email to send out union related emails to
coworkers, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board, alleging that the employer’s policy, and its enforcement of
it, violated the Act.26 The case was one of first impression for the
Board, and attracted numerous amicus briefs from labor groups,
employee rights groups, and employer groups.27
The General Counsel for the Board, the Union, and other
employee rights groups, argued that the law should treat email
differently than other equipment because email created a
“gathering place” for communications on work and non-work
issues.28 Unlike other types of equipment, email was interactive
and allowed thousands of communications to occur
simultaneously. Granting an employee access to an email system,
the General Counsel argued, was similar to allowing an employee
to enter an employer’s property (including break rooms) and
engage in solicitation.29 The General Counsel further argued the
Board should evaluate limitations on employees’ use of email the
same way that it evaluates rules limiting employee
communications in the physical workplace. Specifically, the
General Counsel urged the Board to hold that an employer’s ban
on employee use of email during non-work hours was
presumptively unlawful because such a ban would necessarily limit
Section 7 communications.30 To overcome this presumption,
employers would need to demonstrate special circumstances to
justify such a ban. This approach, argued the General Counsel,
properly balanced employees’ rights with the employer’ interest in
maintaining discipline. The majority of the Board disagreed,
holding that employees have no statutory right to use an
employer’s email system for Section 7 purposes, and that the

26

Id. at *1137.
Id. at *1115.
28
Id. at *1112–13. (The General Counsel is independent from the Board
and is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of unfair labor practice
cases. The General Counsel also generally supervises the NLRB field offices in
the processing of cases).
29
Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at *1112–13.
30
Id.
27
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employer did not discriminate against email use along Section 7
lines.31
Employers welcomed the decision, believing it provided them
an unambiguous, workable test to apply when drafting and
enforcing email policies (and access to their systems moving
forward).32
III.

NEW BOARD, A DIFFERENT BALANCE: PURPLE
COMMUNICATIONS REVERSES GUARD PUBLISHING

Seven years after Guard Publishing, the Board reversed course,
holding that employees possess a statutory right to use their
employer’s email systems for Section 7 purposes.33 Accordingly,
employers who give employees access to their email systems must
permit employees to use email for statutorily protected
communications during non-working time. The Board held
employer policies preventing employees from using email on nonworking time are presumptively unlawful—even if the policy does
not discriminate between union-related communications and other
personal or non-work-related use.34
Purple Communications provided communications services for
deaf and hard of hearing individuals.35 Its primary service was sign
language interpretation during video calls. Video relay interpreters
facilitated communication between a hearing party and deaf party
by interpreting spoken language into sign language and viceversa.36 The video relay interpreters used company-provided
computers to perform their jobs. These computers provided access
to the employer’s intranet system and various work programs, but

31

Id. at *1116.
The Union challenged the Board’s finding that the employer did not
discriminatorily enforce its e-mail policy against union activity. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence did not support the
Board’s determination and remanded for further proceedings on that issue and
that issue alone. Guard Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
33
Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (2014).
34
Id. at 14.
35
Id. at 8.
36
Id.
32
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had limited, if any, access to the internet and non-work programs.37
The employer provided employees with an email account, which
was used by employees and managers alike to communicate with
each other.38 The employer maintained a policy that prohibited
employees from using the company’s computers, internet,
voicemail, and email systems to engage in activities on behalf of
organizations that did not have a professional or business
affiliation with the company. The policy also prohibited employees
from sending uninvited personal emails.39
In November 2012, the Communications Workers of America
(“CWA”) held representation elections at two of the employer’s
facilities.40 After CWA lost both elections, it filed an unfair labor
practices claim, alleging that the employer had unlawfully
interfered with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity.
Specifically, CWA alleged that the employer’s policy prohibiting
the use of its equipment for anything other than business purposes
violated the Act.41
Examining the CWA’s claims, the Board adopted a new
analytical framework for evaluating employees’ use of an
employer’s email systems, holding email had effectively become a
“natural gathering place,” pervasively used for employee-toemployee conversations.42 Given the extensive and pervasive use
of email in the workplace, the Board held it should be treated
differently than other types of workplace equipment. Unlike
bulletin boards with a finite amount of space or copy machines that
could become backed up with heavy usage, the Board found
email’s flexibility and capacity made competing demands on its
use considerably less of an issue than with earlier forms of
communications equipment.43 The Board further determined that
employee email use would rarely interfere with other’s use of the

37

Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
39
Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 9.
40
Id. at 10.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 33.
43
Id. at 37.
38
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email system or add significant incremental usage costs.44 Email
was neither solicitation nor distribution and the Board found it
unnecessary to characterize email systems as a work or non-work
area. Email was simply “communication” and an employer’s email
system amounted to a mixed-use area. The Board required that
employers allow employees to use company email to engage in
Section 7 activity during non-work hours.45
A. The Purple Communications Decision Disregards Employer
Property Rights
The Board’s analysis concerning employee use of employer
provided email effectively ignores the legitimacy of employer
property rights and entrepreneurial control recognized by the
Board in Republic Aviation. Although the Board majority in Purple
Communications claimed to reaffirm the principles first set forth in
Republic Aviation, the Board’s decision is inconsistent with
decades of precedent concerning employer-provided equipment.
An employer-provided email system, first and foremost, is a
piece of equipment, and the Board should have treated it as such.
The employer bears the cost of developing, operating, and
maintaining the system. Similarly, the employer alone bears the
risk of loss when the system goes down. Significant costs arise in
providing email:
•

An hour of email downtime costs, on average, $100,000,
with some companies reporting costs of $1 million to over
$5 million per hour of downtime.46

•

Osterman Research, a Washington State based market
research firm, estimates the initial cost of developing an

44

Purple Commc’ns, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 37.
Id. at 61–62. (The employer appealed the Board’s decision to the Ninth
Circuit. The appeal is pending.)
46
Cost of Hourly Downtime Soars: 81% of Enterprises Say it Exceeds
$300k On Average, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENCE CONSULTING
(August 2, 2016, 5:43 PM), http://itic-corp.com/blog/2016/08/cost-of-hourlydowntime-soars-81-of-enterprises-say-it-exceeds-300k-on-average/.
45
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email system is several hundred dollars per user with the
ongoing costs of $10-$50 per user per month depending on
the size of the organization.47
•

Computer Economics, an IT research firm, estimated that in
2006 computer malware cost companies in excess of $13
billion due to data loss, system crashes, diminished
corporate credibility, increased IT costs, and lost
productivity.48

Additionally, email is a productivity tool. As the Board
recognized in Purple Communications, 96% of employees use
internet, email, or mobile devices to connect them to work and
89% of employees spend an hour or more on email during the
weekday.49 Collectively, North American workers spend nearly 75
billion hours on email every year at a cost of over $1.7 trillion.50
Just as a copier or high speed printer can become backed up by
heavy use, massive quantities of unwanted email in the form of
spam and bulk mailings can disrupt productivity and slow the
employers’ system in the process.51 In addition, unwanted email
imposes unnecessary hardware costs and exposes employers to
unnecessary risk in the form of fraudulent emails.52
While email remained largely unchanged from 2007 through
2014, options available to employees to engage in protected
communications with personal devices grew. Personal email, texts
47

Comparing the Cost of Leading Email Systems, OSTERMAN RESEARCH
(June
2011),
https://www.novell.com/docrep/documents/yuufbom4u2/Comparing_the_Cost_
of_Leading_Email_Systems.pdf.
48
Annual Worldwide Economics Damages from Malware Exceed $13
Billion,
COMPUTER
ECONOMICS
(June
2007),
https://www.computereconomics.com/article.cfm?id=1225.
49
Purple Commc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 26.
50
Graham Winfrey, The Staggering Cost of Business Email, INC. (August
29,
2014),
https://www.inc.com/graham-winfrey/the-staggering-cost-ofbusiness-email.html.
51
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30 Cal. 4th 1342, 1354 (2003).
52
Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based
Policy Approach to Unsolicited E-Mail Advertising, 10 VA. J. L. & TECH. 5, 12
(2005).
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on private phones, and even union mobile applications, provide
employees with multiple avenues to engage in confidential,
protected activity on their personal property, thus minimizing the
need to rely on the employer’s property for these communications.
In Purple Communications, however, the Board ignored these
alternative means of communication. These alternative
platforms—most of which are free and readily accessible to
employees—provide an adequate, if not superior, platform for
employee Section 7 communications, and do so with only minimal
infringement on employer’s property rights. As the Board observed
in Guard Publishing, Section 7 does not require that employees be
provided “the most convenient or most effective means of
conducting [protected] communications,” nor does it require
employers to provide the equipment for employees to do so.53 In
Purple Communications, the Board abandoned this critical element
of the balancing test of employer versus employee rights. As
Member Miscimarra noted in dissent:
This new right will wreak havoc on the enforcement
of one of the oldest, clearest, most easily applied of
the NLRB’s standards—‘working time is for work.’
The majority's new right – combined with the
nature of email and computer usage in most
workplaces – will make it all but impossible to
determine whether or what communications violate
lawful restrictions against solicitation during
working time. The resulting confusion will be out of
all proportion to whatever benefit the new standard
might yield for NLRA-protected concerted
activities.54

53

Guard Publ’g Co., 351 N.L.R.B. at *1115.
Purple Commuc’s, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 83 (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting).
54
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B. Purple Communications Provides No Guidance on How
Employers Can Lawfully Control Employee Email Usage Even
During Working Time
Simply put, employers are potentially liable for what an
employee posts on the Internet.55 The Internet and email systems
provide fertile ground for employees to engage in online
harassment of co-workers and others. Employers must retain
authority to monitor employees’ electronic conduct to avoid state
and federal liability for harassment and defamation. Monitoring
obligations also arise under laws governing digital piracy,
computer fraud, and Homeland Security. For example, the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) prohibits knowingly
accessing a protected computer and obtaining something of value
without authorization.56 Courts hold employers liable under CFAA
when employees access protected employee or customer
information from other entities’ computer systems.57 Similarly,
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, employers
potentially have an obligation to ensure that employees are not
downloading movies, music, etc. onto company property or
distributing them via company email systems.58 Employers have a
compelling interest in monitoring employee conduct to ensure
compliance with these and other laws.
Under the Board’s new analytical framework, an employer
cannot limit employee access to email for Section 7 purposes
during non-working time unless the employer first demonstrates
special circumstances necessary to maintain production or
discipline.59 While employers may apply uniformly enforced
regulations over email systems, they can do so only to the extent
such controls remain necessary to maintain production and
discipline. In addition, employers cannot restrict employee email
use to protect interests that are merely theoretical. The Board,
55

Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 164 N.J. 38, 57 (2000).
18 U.S.C. § 1030(4) (2012).
57
Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, No. 04 C 7071, 2005 WL 2369815 at *6
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 27, 2005).
58
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (Oct. 28, 1998).
59
Purple Commuc’ns, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 62.
56
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however, does not define “special circumstances,” and its decision
provides no guidelines for employers on how to effectively
prohibit improper use of employer provided email while still
permitting free exchange of Section 7 communications during
working time. For example, Purple Communications does not
make clear whether an employer could adopt an otherwise
reasonable rule prohibiting mass distribution of non-business email
messages without the employer demonstrating that mass mailings
affected productivity. Moreover, if such a rule had a disparate
impact on union related communications—because, for example,
they tend to be sent to large swaths of employees—it is unclear
whether the Board would still permit the rule even in the absence
of any evidence that the employer was enforcing the rule in a
discriminatory manner.
Absent clear guidance from the Board, employers will continue
to struggle to develop email policies that comply with the law. As
Member Miscimarra noted in dissent:
[T]he majority today replaces a longstanding rule
that was easily understood. In its place, the majority
substitutes (i) a presumption giving all employees
the right to engage in Section 7 activities using
employer email systems to which they otherwise
have access, and (ii) unspecified “special
circumstances” that, if proven by the employer in
after-the-fact Board litigation, will mean employees
did not have the majority's presumed statutory “useof-email” right.60
In addition, the Act prohibits employers from engaging in
surveillance of their employees’ Section 7 activity or from creating
the impression of surveillance. Employers are permitted to
lawfully observe public union activity so long as they do not do
something “out of the ordinary.”61 Therefore, the Board in Purple
Communications held that employers may monitor employees’
60

Purple Commuc’s, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 126 at 84.
Sands Hotel, San Juan, 306 N.L.R.B. 172 (1992), enforced, 993 F.2d 913
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
61
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electronic communications for legitimate management reasons, so
long as the employer does nothing out of the ordinary, such as
intentionally increasing or focusing its monitoring in response to
Section 7 activity. The Board did not, however, define what
constituted a legitimate management reason. The Board also
declined to explain whether a blanket email monitoring policy, or
even an email monitoring policy that focused solely on non-workrelated email, would create the impression of surveillance. The
absence of clear guidance on these issues exposes employers to
liability for enforcing the longstanding rule that working time is for
work. If an employer allows employees to use email for protected
activities, but still seeks to limit other, non-protected personal use,
such as online shopping or fantasy sports, how does the employer
lawfully monitor compliance with this policy? The Board does not
answer this question. Instead, the Board posits that surveillance
allegations involving employer provided email would be assessed
using the same standards that the Board applied in the brick-andmortar world.
In contrast to the inherent invitation in Purple Communications
to litigate the lawfulness of future restrictions and monitoring of
email use, the Board’s holding in Guard Publishing provided
employers with a straightforward and workable rule on how to
manage employee use of email and the Internet. After Guard
Publishing, employers had two options: they could either outright
prohibit employees from using email for personal use, or they
could allow personal use of email, so long as they did not limit or
restrict employee use of that email in a discriminatory manner
against union activity. While some employers attempted to prevent
abuse of company systems by prohibiting all personal use of email
and Internet access, such policies often proved unworkable for
practical reasons. Employers retained little incentive to commit the
resources necessary to monitor when employees sent or received
personal emails, much less discipline them for doing so. In
addition, most companies in today’s workplace could not
realistically attract and retain employees without permitting
reasonable use of email and the Internet. More often than not,
employers choose to adopt reasonable rules limiting email to
narrowly address particular problems, and took the necessary steps
to ensure that the rules did not discriminate against union or other

64
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concerted activity. The Board’s decision in Purple
Communications replaced this clear test with an ambiguous and
unworkable one. Again, as Member Miscimarra noted in dissent:
Although the majority's new standards are well
intentioned, they are terribly suited to govern this
very important area, which can quickly involve
thousands of electronic communications even in
small workplaces; where the debilitating impact on
productivity and discipline will likely become clear
only after the fact; and where virtually nobody will
really understand--in real time--whether or when
particular communications are protected. Many
employees will undoubtedly exercise this new right
to use their employer's email system to send what
they
believe
are
protected
nonbusiness
communications, only to learn, afterwards, that they
face lawful discipline or discharge either because
their communications did not constitute Section 7
activity, or the employee's use of email violated a
lawful business-only requirement based on the
“special circumstances” exceptions created today by
the Board majority. For similar reasons, unions and
employers are likely to have great difficulty
advising employees whether or when they can
engage in nonbusiness uses of the employer email
systems.62
C. The Board’s Decision in Purple Communications is Limited to
Email Systems and Will Not be Able to Keep Pace With New
Technologies
Not surprisingly, unions and other employee groups frequently
use new technology to expand organizing activities and
collectively address employment issues. This use of technology
goes beyond email communications to include a combination of
62
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social media and Internet portals. Coworker.org provides an online
tool for workplace organizing and petitioning for changes in
workplace conditions. Although the site was founded by two
former employees of the Service Employees International Union—
a labor union representing nearly two million workers—the site is
not affiliated with any one union.63 The site allows employees to
post petitions calling for specific improvements to their jobs and
workplaces. Petitions range from calling for changes to employee
dress codes, to responding to allegations of retaliation. Other sites
in addition to Coworker.org are developing mobile apps
specifically designed to help employees organize.64
The Board’s holding in Purple Communications is limited to
employer email systems; however, the Board’s General Counsel
continued to expand the decision’s reach.65 As a new technology
develops, employers will be unsure of the rules concerning access
to this new technology. For example, if the employer provides
employees with a smartphone, can it prohibit an employee from
installing any non-work-related applications on the device? Or will
it have to allow an employee to access union organizing
applications on the device during non-work time? The Board will
have to develop a “new” analytical framework for each unique
piece of technology. Ostensibly, this requires the Board to evaluate
whether the technology has effectively become a “natural
63
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on November 17, 2017. On December 1, 2017, Robb issued guidance to
Regional Directors and other Board personnel concerning cases or issues where
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gathering place,” pervasively used for employee-to-employee
conversations. As the Board demonstrated in Purple
Communications, this standard is nebulous.
Email systems became common in many workplaces in the
mid-1990s. The Board did not squarely address the question of
whether employees had a right to engage in protected activity on
employer-provided email systems until more than a decade later.
Even then, the Board articulated a standard for employers to
follow, then abandoned that standard seven years later. Absent a
clear standard like the one articulated by the Board in Guard
Publishing, employers are left to guess how the Board will treat
employee use of future employer-provided technologies. This
uncertainty undoubtedly affects employers’ ability to adapt to new
technology. As Member Miscimarra observed:
In summary, I believe my colleagues’ newly created
statutory right will create significant problems and
intractable challenges for employees, unions,
employers, and the NLRB. This will mean more
work for the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts. However, the losers will be parties who
must endure years of litigation after the above
issues arise (literally) with lightning speed, and then
trudge towards resolution at a pace that, by
comparison, appears to be standing still.66
CONCLUSION
Over twenty years after email has become common in the
workplace, the Board’s decision in Purple Communications leaves
questions unresolved about the extent of an employer’s property
rights, and an employer’s ability to control employees’ use of
company provided technology in a manner consistent with its
productivity goals. Returning to the standard of Guard Publishing
restores clarity to the issue by providing a clear framework that can
be readily applied to developing technology—without repeatedly
66
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revisiting the issue or disrupting the status quo for both employees
and employers in the process.
PRACTICE POINTERS
§

The composition of the National Labor Relations Board
changes with each new administration and this can result in
reversal or significant modification of prior decisions.
Before developing or advising on whether an email or other
workplace policy complies with the National Labor
Relations Act, make sure you are familiar with the most
recent developments and holdings of the Board.

§

As long as the Purple Communications standard remains in
place, employers are advised to ensure and restrictions on
technology use are carefully drafted and supported by
objective evidence to comply with the requirements of
Purple Communications.

§

While Purple Communications recognizes that employers
will need to monitor system usage, how and who monitors
email usage should be carefully considered to preserve
system performance and productivity while avoiding claims
of discriminatory surveillance or interference with protect
activity.

§

While a blanket ban on personal use is generally not
permissible under Purple Communications, the decision
does not require that all employees be provided access to
email or other technology resources if not necessary to
accomplish their job duties. Employers may still limit to
whom these resources are offered, and not provide email or
other communications resources to employees who do not
need them to perform their job duties.
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